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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

JAMES MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CASE
NO. 9887

E. I. WILSON,

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action against a buyer for recovery of the
purchase price of goods purchased from the plaintiff,
wherein defendant answered and admitted purehase of
the goods, but in addition counterclaimed fm- alleged ibreadl
of both e~ess and implied warranties.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case was tried to a jury.

From a verdict and

judgment awarding plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and
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awarding defendant damages upon hi:S counterclaim, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment on the counterclaim and judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or
that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
E. I. Wilson, at the time thi:S action was initiated and
for many years prior thereto, was a resident of Nephi,
Juab County, Utah. Mr. Wilson had been in the turkey
business approximately twelve years in December of 1957.
During that time he had raised from 50,000 to 170,000
turkeys a year.
In the fall of 1957, Mr. Wilson designed a turkey
brooder coop that would be approximately 400 to 450 feet
long by 40 feet wide. He wanted a coop that was large
enough to handle 25,000 to 30,000 poults. In the fall of
that year, approximately November or December, there
was a turkey show held in Salt Lake City. All the manufacturers of turkey equipment sent a manufacturer's representative and framed displays of their products. James
Manufacturing Company had a display of turkey feeder
units and ventilator systems. Mr. Ray Tuttle was the factory representative. Mr. Wilson had occasion to see the
exhibit of James Manufacturing Company and was espeeially interested in the ventilating system and feeder
units. As a result of this exhibit, he contacted Mr. Tuttle
in Mr. Tuttle's motel in Salt Lake City. Mr. Wilson explained what he anticipated in the way of construction and
what 'his needs would be. He also stated that he had seen
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a sample of the auger feeding unit, (which is the subject
of this lawsuit), in operation at the exhibit and thought
that it would serve his purposes. He and Mr. Tuttle sat
down at the desk and discussed the ventilator system and
drew some rough sketches, which Mr. Wilson took with
him.
From 1952 to 1958 Mr. Wilson dealt with Utah Poultry
and Farmers Co-operative. Utah Ploultry and Farmers
Co-operative was a dealer for James Manufacturing Company and sold products under the trade name of James
Manufacturing Company, to-wit: "Jamesway." Mr. Wilson, both before and after the purchase of tJhe equipment,
which is the subject of this suit, bought J ame1sway equipment from Utah Poultry and Farmers Oo~-operative.
On January 8, 1958, Mr. Wilson arranged to purchase
from Utah Poultry 'and Farmers Co-operative eight 26 inch
ceiling fans with thermostats and K-D Stimaline ventilators.
This purchase was signed on January 8, 19,58, under a purchase order and eontract of Utah Poultry and Farmers
Co-operative (Exhibit P.15). Utah Poultry and Farmers
Co-operative took their usual markup and placed the order
for this equipment with James Manufacturing Cornany.
The equipment was delivered to E. I. Wilson at Nephi,
Utah, from the warehouse and office of Utah Poultry and
Farmers Co-operative in Nephi, Utah, on Utah Poultry
Company trucks.
Later on February 21, 1958, Mr. Wilson met in the
office of Utaih Poultry Company with Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Arza
Adams, an officer and director of Utah Poultry, a Mr. Hopkinson, the purchasing ~agent fm- Utah Poultry, and a Mr.
Woods, who was sales manager foc Utah Poultry. At that
time a conversation was had concerning the purchase olf
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these feeder units and whether they would be satisfactory
for young poults because of the size of the troughs. MT.
Adams and Mr. Tuttle informed Mr. Wilson that they
thought the trough was too large and that this equipment
would not be suitable foc young poults and Mr. Wilson
felt that he could build a ramp up to the trough and that
it would be satisfactocy. Mr. Wilson denied this conversation and claims that it never took place, however, Mr.
Tuttle, Mr. Adamson and Mr. Adams all testified to the
circumstance and conversation. In any event on February 21, 1958, Mr. Wilson placed an order for 800 feet of
auger turkey feeders with the Utah Poultry and Farmers
Co-operative. This order was placed upon the contract
form of Utah Boultry and Farmers Co-operative (Em1:bit
P.15-secnnd page). Utah Poultry and Farmers ~
erative ordered the units from Jamesway and they were
delivered throogh Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative
to E. I. Wilson. It is the contention of Mr. E. I. Wilson
that Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative was merely
the financing agent of E. I. Wilson and that the sales were
actually made by James Manufacturing Company.
Mr. Wilson built the turkey brooder coop and installed
the ventilator system himself. Prior to the first brood
turkeys arriving from the hatchery, Mr. Wilson started
the installation of the turkey feeder units. This he was
doing himself. The turkeys arrived at a time when onehalf of the turkey feeder units, to-wit: 400 feet, had been
installed on the south side of the coop. The other 400 feet
for the north side was never installed. These turkey feeder
units did not work to the satisfaction of Mr. Wilson. He
called James Manufacturing Company at Los Angeles and
requested their assistance in the installation of the turkey
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feeder units and they sent Mr. P&sig, an engineer, and
helpers from Los Angeles to help correct the defect that
Mr. Wilson was complaining of. His complaint was that
the auger would not convey the feed more than fifty feet
from the hopper when, in fact, to operate effectively it
had to convey it 400 feet through the trough. Mr. Tuttle
testified that be·fore the engineer and ICrew left they had
the auger working satisfactorily and conveying feed 400
feet. Mr. Wilson denied that they ever got it operating
effectively and testified that they left before it was op&ating to his satisfaction.
Mr. Wilson testified. that he found that the feeder unit
would not satisfactoruy feed young poults, that they woruld
fall in the trough and could not get out, and that the feed
could not be •conveyed effectively the 400 feet and for that
reason he removed the feeder units then installed, did nort
install the other 400 feet, and took the feeder units and
re-installed them in 200 feet sections in his yard ibr the
use of his range turkeys of a larger size. Mr. Tuttle testified that the reason 1Jhey were removed was that they
were never designed for young poults and that Mr. Wilson
discovered soon after he had attempted to operate one of
them that the trough was too large for young porults and
that they could not reach from the outside without placement of two by forur planking along the outside fror them
to stand on and that they would fall in the trough and could
not get out and that he had been so advised before he purchased the feeder units. In any event, the feeder units were
re-installed by Mr. Wilson in 1hls yard and used by him to
the present time in his range yard.
Mr. Wilson replaced the auger feeder units in the coop
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with overhead feeder units manufactured by the Steve Regan Company.
After Mr. Wilson discovered the alleged defect in the
auger feeder units, he was contacted by Mr. Ray Tuttle,
the manufacturer's representative for James Manufacturing Company, at his turkey ranch in Nephi, Utah. This
was on or abOIUt March 10, 1958. At this time no complaint
or mention of the defects in either the ventilator system
or the turkey feeder units was made to Mr. Tuttle. Mr.
Wilson, on the contrary, wanted to purchase seventy-five
10 foot turkey feeders of a range type. These are barrel
type units with trays on the bottom that axe placed in the
open range :for turkeys approaching maturity. Mr. Wilson
asked Mr. Tuttle if James Manufacturing Company would
sell these units to 'him direct and finance the units for him.
Mr. Tuttle contacted his employer by phone ·and got the
authorization and sold these seventy-five turkey feeders
directly to Mr. Wilson for $5,250.00 on a contract (Exhibit
D-10). Mr. Wilson did not pay for the seventy-five turkey
feeders. The plaintiff, by numeroll.lS letteTS, attempted to
get its financing contracts signed and paid. See Exhibits
P-1 dated April 8, 1958; P-2 dated April22, 1958; P-3 dated
May 28, 1958; defendant's letter to plaintiff P-4 dated October 2, 1958; P-5 dated November 5, 1958; P-6 dated Decemlber 9, 1958; P-7 dated January 29, 1959. Mr. Wilson,
instead of paying the contracts, requested refinancing which
was granted on two different occasions (E)chibits P-5, P-14).
After no results were received from the above letters,
Mr. Mark Adamson, Jamesway's Utah territory man, ob·
tained a refinancing note and contract (Emibit P.14) from
Mr. Wilson after contacting ·him personally in Nephi. The
original oontraJct called for payments as follows: Exhibit
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D-10) $1,000.00 June 15, 1958; $1,000.00 September 15,
1958;$3,250.00 March 15, 1959. These payments were adjusted on February 18, 1959 (Exhibit P.14) to provide for
payments as follows; $1,000.00 on March 15 ,1959; $1,000.00
June 15, 1959; and $3,250.00 on September 15, 1959. Mr.
Adamson testified no {)Totest or complaint was made 1n him
at the time of the execution of the refinancing contract.
Neither did he, in any of his lett~s up to the letter of March
16, 1959, (Exhibit P-8) make any complaint nor did he
request any off-set or discount because of alleged defects in
the ventilator system or the auger feeder units. The James
Manufacturing Company did, however, at Mr. Wilson's
request, extend the payment one year.
Eventually, in June of 19,59, after no payments had
been made, the plaintiff requested payment or the rerturn
of the merchandise, and Mr. Wilson refused 'and the plaintiff instituted this action to repossess the turkey feeders.
Upon filing the action the plaintiff repossessed the equipment on a writ of replevin and resold it, and the defendant filed a counterclaim asking for damages because of alleged defects and breach of warranties in the sale of the
eight 26 inch ceiling fans with K-D Stimaline ventilatocs,
and in the automatic feeders, auger type. The plaintiff
contends that neither items were sold by it, but were sold,
in fact, by Utalh Pountry and Farmers Co~orperative and
that there was not, in fact, any breach of warranty under
either item.
Testimony was elicited concerning the number of turkeys that died from the period 1958 through 1959 and testimony was obtained from Dr. ~alA. Bagley, a veterinnary who was on call by Mr. Wilson during this period, that
the turkeys died from various causes of an epedemic pro-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

portion, such as paratyphoid, sulfaquinoxaline poisoning
(over-medication), air sack lesion, vent pi,cking, cholera,
Newcastle Disease, cerebral hemorage, cannabilism, blue
coomb ( a virus infection), and many other causes that
would nort be related to drafts or ventilating. Mr. Wilson
put on testimony eoncerning drafts and temperature variations that, in his opinion, ·caused the death of the turkeys.
This fact situation is mentioned only insofar as it affects
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered testimony. There was no dispute on the plaintiff's complaint except as to the amount of attorneys fee
and the case was tried on the defendant's counterclaim.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE JURY
TRIAL OVER THIE OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF.
The record will disclose that a demand for trial was
made by the plaintiff. The demand for trial was on a
standard form and requested a non-jury trial (R. 113).
Both plaintiff and defendant appeared at the pretrial conference at 10:00 A. M. on the 27th day of August, 1962.
At thast time the plaintiff appeared by and through Jackson B. Howard and the defendant appeared by and through
W. Eugene Hansen. Matters were set down in ·the pretrial
order and the Court instructed the plaintiff to prepare rthe
pretrial order. The pretrial order was prepared in conformity to the Court's instruction and the matter was set
for trial without a jury and the estimate of time of trial was
two days based upon a non-jury setting. The date of the
said trial was to ~commence on the 30th day of October,
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1962. On the late afternoon of Octoiber 24, 1962, counsel
for the plaintiff called counsel for the defendant to discuss
the stipuations that might be entered into in order to expedite the trial. At that time the defendant informed the
plaintiff that it was his belief that the trial would be a jury
trial. Counsel for the plaintiff informed counsel for the
defendant he was not prepared for such a trial and that he
would contact the Court concerning it. Because of Court
commitments in Richfield on the 25th, the plaintiff had no
opportunity to review the file or consult with the Court
until the 26th of October, at which time plaintiff talked
to the Court by phone concerning the jury trial. The file
discloses that the only request for jury trial was in a letter from the defendant's attorney dated September 11, 1962,
addressed to the HonoTable C. Nelson Day, Judge, Fifth
Judicial District, Manti, Utah, a cwbon copy of whioh was
sent to the office of the plaintiff's attorney. That letter
is not part of the recocd but is set out as follows:
"September 11, 1962
Honocable C. Nelson Day, Judge
Fifth Judicial District
Manti, Utah
Re:

James Manufacturing vs. Ernest Wilson
Civil No. 3937

Dear Judge Day:
I recently received a copy of the Pretrial Order.
I had expected that Jackson would mail a copy to us
for approval before it was signed ;however, I note he
submitted it directly to the Court foc signature.
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I had written Jackson before receiving the! Pr~
trial Order indicating that Arthur had an additional
issue he wanted included in the Order ooncerning the
sale of the turkey feeders as set forth in Plaintiff's
Complaint. The issue being whether or not they obtained the reasonable value of the feeders on their
repossession sale.
Arthur is in Washington, D.C. at the present time
and I hesitate filing a motion and setting it up for
argument on a point which is relatively mino[' until
such time as he returns and either works out the matter upon stipulation with Jackson oc personally decides
to notice it up for hearing.
I am therefore sending this letter in hopes that
this one phase of the Pretrial Order mig1ht remain open
until Arthurs return. I also mailed a check to the
Clerk yesterday to cover the jury fees in the case since
it was requested by the client.

Sincerely yours,
W. Eugene Hansen
WEH:bt
cc:

Jackson Hloward, Attorney"

The very last paragraph is the only reference to a jury
trial setting ever made by the defendant and it is merelY
a statement that "I mailed a check to the Clerk yeste!I'day
to oover the jury fee in the case since it was requested by
the client." Although it is not a tribute to rounsel for the
plaintiff, nevertheless, this particular sentence was overlooked inasmuch as the substance of the letter was that
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Mr. Nielsen would be back from Washington and would be
in contact with the Court and counsel for the plaintiff when
he returned. Based upon the assumption that the trial
would not be of a jury nature, ·counsel did not have an
opportunity to review the panel, could not determine the
background of the jurors and was prohibited from obtaining a new panel under provision 78-46-23. The Court advised counsel for the plaintiff om Octobe·r 26th that he was
going to order the Clerk to secure a jury. Octoiber 26,
1962, was the Friday prior to trial, which was Tuesday,

October 30th. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff was
denied an opportunity to properly analyze the jury panel
and, consequently, was forced to select a jury at a considerable handicap. Plaintiff was also prrevented from requesting a postponement of trial because subpoenas had
been sent to numerous witnesses, witness fees paid, and
one witness was enroute from Los Ange~es.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the Court
should have refused to grant a jury trial. The plaintiff
contends that no proper demand for a jury trial was made
in accordance with law. Article I, Section 2, of the Utah
Constitutiern states "a jury in civil cases shall be waived
unless demanded." Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a jury trial can be obtained by demand
and defines what demand is under the Constitution. Rule
38(b) states:
"b.

Demand.

Any party may demand a trial by jury

of any issue triable of right by jury by paying the

statutocy jury fee and se:rving upon the other parties
a demand therefor in writing at any time after the
commencement of the action and nort later than shall
be fixed by rule of the oourt in whiCh the action is
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pending. Such demand may be endorsed upon a plead
ing of the party."
No demand was made in conformity with Rule 38(b;
of the Utah Rules ill Civil Procedure and the defendan·
does not contend that one was. The Fifth Judicial DistriCI
Court apparently has no rule governing this procedure
Inquiry was made both of the Court and the Clerk concern
ing the rule fixed by the Court concerning such demand
and none was available and the Court informed the plain·
tiff's counsel that it had not established rules. Under thesE
circumstances, it is respectfully urged that to compel the
plaintiff to submit to a jury trial on a notice as late as October 26, 1962, was prejudicial and an infringement of its
rights.

POINT IT
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL WIT·
NESSES FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND DENYING THE
PLAINTIFF A RIGHT TO HAVE ITS COUNSEL ASSISTED BY ANY WITNESSES FOR A SUBSTANTIAL
PART OF THE TRIAL.
The record will disclose that the case was called for
trial on 'fuesday, October 30, 1962, at the hour of 10:00
A.M. The first order of business, after hearing the motions of the plaintiff to strike the jury trial, was the selection of the jury. After the jury was selected and prior
to argument of counsel, plaintiff invoked the exclusion rule
(Tr. P.3,L.17). This motion was made at approximately
1:30 P.M., prior to defendant's opening statement to the
jury. Each party indicated who their witnesses were to
be and the witnesses were sworn, however, at that stage
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Mr. Nielsen, Attorney for the defendant, argued to the
Cow1: that plaintiff was not entitled to have anyone assist
counsel if it invoked the rule because the plaintiff was a
corporate entity. It was Mr. Nielsen's contention that a
corporate entity can only be represented by its principal
officers and that counsel for a covporate entity can retain
with him as an assistant during the eourse of the trial only
a corporate officer who stands in the stead of the corporate
entity. This was contrary to/ the plaintiff's: view of the
case and plaintiff elected to stand by its motion to exclude
witnesses.
On the basis of the arguments which were strenuous
and heated and cover pages 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the transcript,
1Jhe Court ruled that Mr. Tuttle, the witness chosen by the
plaintiff to assist counsel, would he excluded. From that
period of time, approximate,ly 1:30 P.M., until late in the
afternoon of the first day of trial, OctOber 30, 1962, the
plaintiff was compelled to conduct the trial of the matter
without the asistance of its key wi1ness, while the defendant was allowed to remain in the courtroom all during the
course of the arguments and trial.
On the eonclusion of the defendant's opening statement, during which time all of the wi1nesses for the plaintiff, including Mr. Tuttle, were absent from the courtroom,
the plaintiff again reiterated its motion and oibjection to
the Court's sequestration of its witnesses (Tr. P.8, L. 30
and P.10, L. 20):
"MR. HOWARD: ,May it please the Court and jury,
we would prefer to reserve our argument until the defendant is 1Jhrot1g1h with their case in chief. NO!W, your Honor,
I am reluctant to press an issue the Court has ruled upon
because I believe it is a matter of prejudicial error. I think
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it is important to infmm the Court that unless my client
is allowed to be represented by a representative they are
deprived of their rights because the law says that a party
may attend the Court; and the rule does nort apply to a
party. Now, if Mr. N[elson's argument is sound, the only
person who could be a party in a -corporate action would
be the president, probably, or some officer. Now, if you
get the situation were you have a corporate party, that
corporate party may be present by any representative it
chooses to have present, and the attorney for the plaintiff is me; and I elect to have Mr. Tuttle here. Otherwise,
my client is deprived of the right to be present at this trial
even thou~h the defendant who is a party is present, whlch
is a gross lack of neutrality in the trial of this case. Otherwise, the corporate client cannot be present because a corporation is an artificial being, there's no personage, fuere's
no party except insofar as it is represented by representatives.
So I say Mr. Tuttle is their representative, He's the
one that has knowledge of this situation. He's the one
they have selected to be present. He's the one who must
be present. Yoru take a corporation like United States Steel,
the president and officers have no dealings generally wi1Jh
any of the transactions. They could never be present in
Court except by counsel.
MR. NIELSON: I submit to the Court that Mr. Howard made a fine statement in front of the jury about his
client brut there's nothing wrong with ·the president or any
officer or managing agent of the corporation being pNSent, but he's asked for a salesman to be in here. The corporation doesn't have to be here if it doesn't want to he
here; but if they want to be here badly enough, then, whY
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doesn't one of the officers or managing agent of the corporation be here? If Mr. Wilson doesn't want to be here,
he doesn't have to be here. But if he wants to be here,
he has got to be here.
MR. HOWARD: The question answers itself, your
Honor. I am sure I can find authorities on that subject.
I have researched it before and I am confident tlhat they
can be present by who they choose. The state has the same
privilege. They are not a being. The exception to the
rule is the one person they elect to be present for them.
THE COURT: I have already ruled on the matter.
I'm going to let that ruling stand unless and until you
show me something more than you have."
. The trial then commenced and Mr. Wilson was allowed
to testify. Mr. Wilson, the defendant, testified for o~er
an hour before the Court took its afternoon recess. The
testimony of Mr. Wilson during the period in which all witnesses for the plaintiff were excluded, ·concemed construction of the brooder coops; the number of trips he made
to Salt Lake to the turkey shows, and where he saw the
auger feeders in operation; the testimony concerning a
paratyphoid outbreak in his brooder coop; testimony concerning his knowledge of turkey operations; his acquaintance with the operations of George Harmon, Milt Harmon, Mr. McKay, Wendell Hansen, a Mr. Gardner, George
H. Ostler and George T. Ostler; his testimony ·onncerning
normal loss; testimony concerning his knowledge of Jamesway, his discussions with Ray Tuttle at Covey's Motel.
All of this testimony was elicited o~er the objection of the
plaintiff outside of the presence of plaintiff's key witness.
After the time of the Court's afternoon recess at approximately 3:00P.M., the plaintiff again reiterated its oib-
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jection to the e,xdusion of its witness (Tr. P. 11, L. 24-30).
Counsel was allowed the opportunity to research in the
library for approximately twenty minutes, wherupon 1Jhe
Court reconvened at approximately 3:30 P.M. Page 12
of the transcript shows what transpired after Court was
reconvened:

"THJE COURT: The record should show that we were
delayed for a few minutes because Mr. Howard was using
the library to look for some law.
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I would like to make
a motion and perhaps counsel would prefer we do it outside
of the jury.

THE COURT: Let's not send the jury out again.
Why don't you come up here to the bench and let's discuss
this for just a minute?
DISC:USSION between Court
and counsel not reported.)
THE COURT: 'rhe record should show that the Jury
is in the box and I think we are prepared to go ahead. Mr.
Nielson, you may proceed.
MR. NIELSON: I would like the record to show my
objection to Mr. Ray Tuttle being in the Courtroom after
his counsel has invoked the exclusion rule and will state
again I have no objection to Mr. Park Adamson, representative of the oompany being present if he wants his present; but I object to his bringing into the room Mr. Ray
Tuttle after he has invoked the exclusion rule.
The record should show in that regard that pending the recess Mr. Howard has exhibited to
the Court a Supreme Court case in the State of Utah which
in substance and effect provides that the Court within its
discretion may permit a representative of the party to be
THE COURT:
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in 1Jhe Courtroom even though the exclusion rule has been
invoked; and Mr. Howard has chosen Mr. Ray Tuttle and
therefore the Court in its discretion has permitted him to
return into the Courtroom. And your objection is denied
at this point.
1\ffi. HOWARD: Now, we will withdraw oor last objection to the testimony of this witness.

THE OOURT:

All right."

Prior to Mr. Wilson testifying, an objection had been
made to his testimony concerning transactions with plaintiff company oc any of its officers or agents and especially
with Mr. Thttle at a time when Mr. Tuttle was not present to assist counsel concerning the testimony. Foc that
reason when Mr. Tuttle was allowed to re-enter the ·courtroom the plaintiff withdrew its objection to future testimony of the defendant orf his transactions and negotiations
with Mr. Tuttle.

Although the Court 1changed its mind concerning the
propriety of having witness for the plaintiff present to assist counsel during the course o[ the trial, it is the position
of the plaintiff that such ruling was too late to overcome
the handicap inflicted upon the plaintiff by the absence
of its witness during a material and substantial portion of
the trial. Since Mr. Tuttle at no time had an opportunity
to review the transcript or the testimony of Mr. Wilson
during the time in which he was outside of the courtroom,
it is impossible to tell whether erroo.eoiUS infocmation was
elicited from Mr. Wilson and, therefore, the plaintiff was
prevented from properly cross-examining ·Mr. Wilson concerning the testimony that was elicited during 1Jhe absence
of Mr. Thttle.
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The Court has ruled upon this subject before in th~
case of Xenakis, et al vs. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., 26~
P.2d 1007, which is a case whffi"ein a party injured in ru
automobile accident brought suit against the defendan1
Apparently the action concerned the alleged negligence o:
the defendant's truck driven by one of its drivers. It wru
the ~contention of the plaintiff that the court erred in grant
ing their motion to exclude witnesses and yet permit~
the defendant's truck driver to remain in court during thE
trial to assist counsel for the defendant. The ~oourt rulee
on this issue as follows:
"Where witnesses are excluded it is common practice
to allow one witness having spedal knowledge of the
facts to emain in the courtroom to advise with counsel
concerning the progress and management o[ the trial.
It is not mandatory that this be done, but the entire
matter of exclusion of witnesses rests within the sound
discretion of tJhe trial court and its action will not be
disturbed in the absence of showing clear abuse. The
record here shows that he expressly announced that
the truck driver Mr. Thompson, could remain in the
courtroom and no objection was voiced by the plaintiff."
In this instance, the plaintiff contends that the failure
of the ~court to allow Mr. Tuttle to remain in the oourtroom
during the COIU1'se of the testimony of Mr. Wilson was a
clear abuse of sound d.i.scrotion. Mr. Wilson's entire case
rested on his alleged transactions with Mr. Tuttle. It
was tlhe contention of Mr. Wilson that he purchased the
ventilator and the feeders from James Manufacturing Company through their representative, Mr. Tuttle, and that the
warranties for which he claimed a breach were made or-
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ally by Mr. Tuttle. To deny the plaintiff the right to have
Mr. Tuttle present during the course of a substantial amount
of Mr. Wilson's testimony was dearly prejudicial and an
abuse of discretion.

POINT ill
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 8
OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF.
The plaintiff's objection on this point is restricted to
the plaintiff's alleged breach of warranty in respect to the
auger type turkey feeders. It is the contention of the
plaintiff that thoce could be no breach of warranty of the
auger type feeder units for the follorwing reasons:
1. The auger type feeder units w&e so~d to the defendant by Utah Poultry and Farmers Oo-orperative and
not the plaintiff.
2. The defendant pwchased the auger feeder units
based upon his observation of a sample.
3. The buyer was an experienced turkey operator
who ordered a particular piece of merchandise for !his own
purposes.

The defendant gave 1Jhe plaintiff no notice as required by law of an alleged claim of breach of warranty.
5. The defendant is estopped from claiming breach
of warranty because of his utilization and use of the said
auger feeders.
4.

In respect to the question of whether plaintiff sold
these auger feeders to the defendant, that matteT will be
taken up in the subsequent argument. The plaintiff will
address itself to the question of warranty and its relationship to this exhibit. It is the contention of the plaintiff
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that under the circumstances of this case, defendant is not
entitled to daim a breach of warranty.
The facts are that Mr. Wilson saw the particular feeder
unit purohased at a display of the same by J amesway at
the Utah Turkey Show in Salt Lake City in November or
December of 1957. He was impressed by the operation of
the sample unit installed at that show. Mr. Wilson contacted Mr. Tuttle at his hotel ~oom in Salt Lake for the
purpose of discussing both the auger feeder units and the
ventilator system. Mr. Wilson was a man of great experience in the turkey raising field, having been in the business for moce than twelve years and having raised 170,000
turkeys the year preceding the purchase of the auger feeder
units. He was well aware of the size of young poults and
the mechanical limitations and advantages of the proposed
feeder units. This he discussed with Mr. Tuttle in detail.
The fact, although disputed, is that he discussed this matter :furtller with Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Adamson, Mr. Orvil Adams, Mr. Wood and Mr. Ifupkinson in the office olf Utah
Poultry on or about the 26th day of February, 1958, and
was advised that in their opinion this auger unit was too
large for young poults. Mr. Wilson was of the rrrlnd that
he could place two by four planks along the outside perifecy of the trough in order that the young poults could
stand on the planks and eat out of the trough supplied by
the auger. He was advised by Mr. Adams, who is a turkey grower and a director of the Utah Poultry Company,
and Mr. Tuttle that little turkeys might have difficulty
eating out of the trough and that if they got in the trough
they might have difficulty getting out. Wilson felt that
there would be no difficulty in this regard and that he
would be willing to take that chance. This testimonY is
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substantiated by Mr. Wilson's own concern, as expressed in
the record (Tr. P. 13, L. 23):
"A. I told him t:Jhat I had examined tJhe sample feeder
and I liked this feeder, ex!cept I thought it was a little too
deep and I asked him if there was a possibility to make a
smaller trough, one that wasn't so high; that I wanted to
use this in my coop."
It is obvious from this statement tJhat Mr. Wilson
recognized the limited use of this type of feeder unit, but
neverhlleless that he wanted it fm- his coop. Under those
circumstances Mr. Wilson cannot rely upon an implied
warranty that the auger feeder unit was not suitable for
his purposes, as expressed to Mr. Tutle. Authorities in
this regard are as foll01ws:

Uniform Sales Act, Title 60-1-15, Sub. Sec. 3 is as
follows:
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards defects which such exam-

ination ought to have revealed."
Under these circumstances, where he has examined
the goods, and is cognizant of their construction, he cannot complaint that the goods were not suitaJble fior young
poults. This is especially true where he has had the great
experience that he has had in the turkey business.
In the case of Landers & Co. v. Fallows, et al., 81 Utah
432, the court took up this particular subject and stated
as follows:

"* * * Moreover, there is no warranty of fitness where
the buyer orders a specific article for a specific purpose known to the Seller. Davenport Ladder Company vs. Hines Lumber Company, (C.C.A.) 43 F2d
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63, Sturtevant Company vs. LeMar's Gas Company,
188 Iowa 584, 176 N.W. 338." * * * * "Where goods
are sold on inspection, there is no standard but identity, and no warranty implied orther than that the identical goods sold, and no others, shall be delivered. 5·5
C.J. 717, Sec. 704; Downey v. Price Chemical Co., 204
Ky. 98, 263 S.W. 690. And in such ease, the buyer
must protect himself by a special, or promissory, warranty against known or visible defects; which would
naturally be the seller's agreement to repair them, so
that the machine will do good work."
The above citations are permitted on the question of
the suitability of the particular augeT feeder units for the
purpose required by the defendant. There is no claim
whatever by the defendant that the goods received, to~wit:
the auger feeder unit, did not comply, at least in form and
shape, to the sample he saw. Under those circumstances
there ean be no implied warranty that as far as the shape
and construction of the goods are coocerned, that they
were not suitable for his purpose.
In adition to the fact that the auger feeder unit was
sold by sample and inspection, thereby precluding an impJied warranty under Title 60-1-15 Sub. Sec. 3, the warranty would also be unavailable by reason of Title 60-1-15
and 60-1-15 Sub. Sec. 1. These provisions are as follows:
"Implied warranties of quality-Subject to the provisions of this title and of any statute in that behalf,
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
quality or fitness for any particular pwpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows: (1) Where the buyer, e~ressly or by im·
pli!cation, makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which goods are required, and it appears
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that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(emphasis added) (whether he is the grower or manufacturer or nort), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
It is plain, therefore, that in order for an implied warranty to arise under these provisions, that the buyer must
rely on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the goods
for the particular purpose as stated to him by the buyer.
A summary of the law concerning the necessity of the
buye,r' s reliance in general and of his reliance in this type
of sale is as follows:

"Extent and Qualifications of Gene1ral Rule as to Warranty of Fitness; ReUance upon Seller's Judgment,
Skill, or Experience - As a general rule, notwithstanding goods are sold for a particular use, if the
buyer himself understands what he wants and has a
full opportunity to acquire a knowledge of any fact
necessary to enable him to form a correct e~stimate,
and selects such goods as he deems adapted to the
intended use, there is no warranty of their fitness for
such use. The existence or nonexistence of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
must, and necessarily does, depend upon whether the
buyer relied upon the skill or judgment of the seller,
and this is a question of fact which is oniinarily to
be determined by a jury under appropriate instructions." 46 Am. Jur. 532, Sec. 348.
"In Sale of Machinery-The existence of an implied
warranty of fitness by a manufacturer or seHer of

machinery depends upon the same considern.tions which
govern the existence of a warranty of fitness generally. The first inquiry is whether the purdtaser under all the circumstances may be deemed to have depended on the judgment, skill, or e::qlerimce of the
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seller, a supposition that cannot exist where the purchaser makes the selection or orders a known and
described article of machinery, or specifies certain
qualities or -characteristics, even though he also discloses the purpose for which he intends to use it."
46 Am. Jur. 534, Sec. 349.
Under the circumstances of this case, where Wilson,
a turkey grower with vast experience, with ample opportunity to gain a full knowledge of the auger feeder, and
indeed where he made his own selection for his own purposes, it would seem inconceivable that any reliance was
placed on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the
goods purchased.
This brings us to the next point in respect to the
warranty, ·and that is whethe~r the auger units would, in
fact, convey feed for 400 feet, as required by his coop
construction. This is a more difficult question. This
question, however, is not related to implied warranty, but
is related to ~ress warranty. At this stage of the argument it must be admitted that there cannot be implied
warranty of the auger feeder units in this regard and if
the defendant has any case at all, it must rest on express
warranty concerning 1Jhe ability of the auger feeder units
to convey feed for 400 feet in the coop.
It is Mr. Wilson's contention 1Jhat he explained to
Mr. Tuttle that the feeder units would be 400 feet long
and Mr. Tuttle assured him that the auger would convey
feed for that distance. The evidence is in dispute as to
whether Jamesway eventually got the one feeder unit
that was installed working so that it did convey feed for
that distance. The plaintiff contends that Mr. Persig and
the engineer had the machine operating satisfactorilY
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when they returned to California, but Mr. Wilson testifies that it never did operate satisfactorily and the greatest distance it would convey after they had repaired it
was that it would convey feed two-.thirds of the way down
(Tr. 22, Line 1). Regardless of that circumstance Mr.
Wilson elected, whe1Jher for reason that the auger units
would not convey 400 feet or because the trough construction was unsuitable for young poults, to remove the
one 400 feet unit installed and place that in the yard for
the purpose of feeding turkeys of a more mature age of
approximately eight weeks. He broke the units into eight
units (Tr. P. 47 and 48). He states in his deposition that
these units were installed in two hundred foot sections
and that he bought seven additional bins to add to the
one that he already had so that he had eight feeding
units (Tr. P. 33). It would be difficult to see how the
800 feet of auger feeder units purchased from J amesway
could be broken into eight 200 foot feeders, however, the
fact remains that these auger feeder units were installed
in the yard and actually operated there from March of
1958 until the present time. No complaint was ever registered with J amesway concerning these auger feeders in
all of the correspondence to J:ames Manufacturing Company until the questioned Exhibit 8 (See Exhibits). The
testimony concerning the operation of these auger feeder
units in the yard is as follows: (Tr. P. 28, L. 7 through
L. 13; Tr. P. 52, L. 15 through L. 20).
Q.

What I want to know, did you offer to re-

turn it to James Way?

A.
Q.
A.

No, I did not.
What did you do with it?
I took it out in the field and installed it in
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200 foot sections which we were able to manage reasonably well.
MR. HOWAR\D: I'm asking-I'm on Page 28
Question 6 talking about these feeders. "Q·. Did
you make a claim to the James Way Manufacturing
Company for loss of your turkeys because of this
defective equipment? A. Did I? Q. Yes. A. No,
I was trying to get along with James Way Manufacturing Company." That's true, isn't it?
Borth in his deposition and in the trial he stated that
he had never made any eomplaint to James Manufacturing Company concerning these turkey feeders because
he was trying to get along with them. The fact is that
after he discovered the alleged defect in the turkey feeders he purchased 75 additional range feeders of a different colllStruetion from James Manufacturing Company.
The evidence is also replete with correspondence concerning James Manufacturing Company's efforts to get him
to pay fhr the latter turkey feeders which he had purchased from them. In none of this correspondence is any
claim made that the auger turkey feeders were not working satisfactorily or that he wanted any adjustment on
them. At the trial of the case Mr. Wilson produces a
lett&, which has been marked as defendant's Emibit 8
for introduction. Objection was made to the introduction o!f this exhibit on the basis that it was a copy of a
purported letter supposedly written to the plaintiff, and
that no effort had been made by the defendant to obtam
the original ,oor;oce the introduction of this exhibit, nor
was there any evidence offered that the original was in
existence; that the plaintiff had ever received it or seen
it before; or, in fact, that it was mailed. The plaintiff
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had taken the deposition of the defendant and had inquired specifically whether defendant daimed a notice
to the plaintiff in writing. In his deposition the defendant answered and said: (Dp. P. 28, L. 14 th~ough L. 27).
Q. Did you make any claim to the Jamesway
Manufacturing Company for the loss of your turkeys
because of this defective equipment?
A. Did I?
Q. Yes?
A. No, I was trying to get along with James
Manufacturing Company.
Q. You weren't upset about it?
A. I was quite upset about i.Jt.
Q. The fact is you bought other equipment after
that?
A. Yes, I bought it from Jarnes.way.
Q. You say you bought it f~om Jarnesway?
A. Yes.
In addition to this, the plaintiff served. upon the de-

fendant Interrogatories:
"8. State whether the automatic feeders referred to
in the second count of the counterclaim were used
subsequent to discovery of their defectiveness."
"A. Yes. These feeders were used at a later date
in the field with larger turkeys, after we had modified them and shortened them to 200 feet so that we
could operate them at all."

"9. If the defendant made objections or protests to
the plaintiff, state to whom and where such protests
were made in respect to (a) 8, 26" ceiling :fans with
thermostats andK-D Stimaline ventilators; (b) the automatic feeders referred to in the second cOWlt of defendant's counterclaim."
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"A. I objected on several occasions, first in reporti:J
that the equipment didn't work and again very for
ibly at the time the representative from Californ
came to my coop to experiment with the short aug
and try the feed to trave1l the whole distance."
In respect to paragraphs 8 and 9 above, if p~
test or claim for damages were made in writing a
tach a copy of such claims or protest.''

"10.

"A. Protests were made verbally in person."
phasis added)

(En

Defendant served interrogatories upon the plainti
requiring the plaintiff to furnish to the defendant copiE
of all correspondence sent or received. Copies of such COl
respondence as could be readily located were delivered 1
the defendant in response to that interrogatory. (Se

Interrogatories No. 20 and 21 of the defoodanrt). Th
production of defendant's Exhibit 8 was a complete sw
prise, for which the plaintiff had no opportunity to rebt
or to produce teSiti.mony in contradiction thereof. If dE
fendant had in mind ·that this document was to be intr<
duced, then it was incumbent upon him to submit deman
for admission of its authenticity under Rule 36. In th
alternative, the defendant could have required us to pre
duce the original under Rule 34, had he let us know tha
there was a copy in existence. The defendant introduce
Exhibit 8 for the purpose of showing notice of breach <J
warranty, which was a material aspect of his case. PJ
orf his an·SIWers to his depositions and interrogatories lur~
the plaintiff into believing there was nothing to be intro
duced or testified to in respect to breach of warranty ex
cept oral conversations between the defendant and em
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ployees of the plaintiff. Nort only was the introduction
of this document a surprise, but has the aspect of entrapment, because the plaintiff had made every effort to discover the evidence the defendant had available for production concerning notice of breach of warranty.
One might think that because of the imperfect quality of the letter that Mr. Wilson decided not to mail it.

The court will note that the last paragraph is illegible.
There may be many explanati01ns 01ther than the mailing
and receipt of this letter. The admission into evidence
of this copy is prejudicial and error O!l1 the part of the
court. Authorities in support of the plaintiff's contention are as follows:
VanLeeuwen vs. Huffaker, 78 Uttah 521, 5 P2d 714:
The VanLeeuwen case involves a situation where the
plaintiff was the assignee of a real estate broker's fee.
The defendant and another person were brought toget~her
by the real estate agent, however, before the contract
was reduced to finality, the defendant and the other person got together and prepared a cO!l1tract away from the
presence of the real estate broker. Later, both the defendant and the other party told the broker that the cootract had been prepared by an attorney and that irt provided for the payment of the real estate broker's fee. The
plaintiff called the real estate broker to testify as rtJo the
contents of the contract. Objection was made to his testimony concerning the contents of the contract on the
basis that no foundation had been laid for permitting secondary evidence of the contents of the contract. Notice
to produce the original of the contract was given at a
former trial. The court held that the previous notice
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was sufficient for the second trial. However, the cot
went on to say, in regards to the objection, that:
"A reading of the transcript shows that the trial cou
in ruling upon the objection, had in mind oruy t
question of whether or not notice to produce whi~
was served prior to the first trial was sufficient
entitle plaintiff to prove the contents of the contra
by secondary evidence; :and the court being of opi
ion that such norUce was sufficient, overruled the o
jection . . . . But the defendant's objection WeJ
farther than that. The objection on t:he ground ~
incompetency raised another question which the oou
seemingly did not consider. As the record stoo
plaintiff had not made any showing which would e1
title him to introduce secondary evidence of the COl
tents of the written contract. fie had not shown ft
original was lost or destroyed, or that the origini
was in the possession of defendant . . . . Theref<m
the court was in error when it overruled the obje(
tion."
Another Utah case on the subject is the case of La1
sen et al v. Ryan, et ·al., 54 U. 250, 180 P. 178. It wa
contended in that case that the court erred in admittin
in evidence a copy of the execution under which the prot
erty was taken by the sheriff. Undoubtedly the sherii
could have produced the original execution, oc if that wa
lost or destroyed, then to have it restored according t
the wen established rules of law procedure. The cour1
hQWever-, admitted the copy in evidence without follow
ing tlhe usual procedure in admitting secondary evidenc
orf a lost document. In doing that the court erred.
In the case of Wilson vs. Davis, et al, 103 P.2d 149
the plaintiff was attempting to testify to the oonten1s o
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certain deeds. The record discloses that the plaintiff had
made a demand for the production of these deeds prior
to trial. The deeds were not produced. On that basis
she was attempting to testify as to their contents. The
court held, concerning the objection raised by the defendant that her testimony was nort the best evidence and
that no proper foundation was laid for the introduction
of her testimony, as follows:
"Here there was no proof of the loss or destruction
of the deed . . . . so as to permit other evidence of
the contents. And obvioiU!Sly, under Section 10516,
no demand upon Mr. Poore to produce them at trial
in May, 1938, can be effectual as a foundation for
such evidence until it has firsrt been shown by evidence that " 'the original is in the possession' " of
Mr. Poore."
Cases concerning this problem that are analogous
are as follows:
Ancrum vs. State Highway Dept., 161 SE 98. In this
case the plaintiff brought an action based on the negligent maintenance of a road after a washout. He tried
to prove the filing of claims by intDoducting copies thereof at the trial. Objection was made that tJhe ·oopies were
not the best evidence. Notice was not given to the defendant to introduce the originals until the time of trial.
The court held that that was not sufficient time f1or the
defendant to comply with the notice, especially where the
office of the defendant was thirty-two miles from the
trial site and that the notice for the production of this
document was not reasonable. A fortiori, in this case
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the offiee of the defendant was 2,000 miles from the
of trial.

pi~

Ciccone v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America,
164 A. 444.
In this case suit was brought upon a life insuram
poJicy issued by the defendant on the life of the plaintiff

deceased husband. The insurance eompany defended c
the basis of lapse of the poHcy by failure to pay the pD
mium. The defendant sought to offer a oopy of the lap
notice sent to the plaintiff's husband. Objection was su:
tained to its admittance by the trial oourt and this ol
jection was appealed by the defendant. The Sup:rem
Court said demand for the original made at the time <
the trial was not timely and that the objection shouJ
have been sustained. The language of the ·court is as fo
lo!WS:
"The rule is that notice given or demand made durin
the trial is not sufficient if the paper is not show
to be in court or readily procurable by the party wh
is supposed to have it, unless the party denies the~
istence of the paper, or that it is in his possession <J
under his control."

POINT IV
THE OOURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRAN
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THl
CDOSE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CASE IN CHIE]
AND IN FAILING TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF';
MOrriON FOR A DIRECTED VERDier .
Plaintiff has cited sufficient reasons in its argumeiJ
to Point III above concerning the auger feeders to jill
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tify deleting that portion of the defendant's cause of action as an issue to be submitted to the jury.
Although the appellant believes that without Exhibit
D-8 in evidence ·the defendant has made no showing of
notice of breach of warranty, nevertheless, it is the appellant's contention that the notice (Exhibit D-8) and
all oral statements of the derfendant are derfeotive as notice of breach of warranty because (1) they were not
timely given and (2) they were inadequate to constitute
notice of breach of warranty.
Taking up the question of warranty in respect to the
ventilator system, the appellant respeetfully urges that
there was no basis upon which this matter could have
been submitted to the jury under any circumstances in
light of the defendant's testimony and in light of 1:Jhe exhibits offered. In this case the defendant used the said
equipment from February, 1958, until April of 195-9,
and if his testimony is believed, had thousands of young
turkeys die because of ill effects of the ventilating system. At no time from January 8, 1958, when he purchased these ventilators and fans t10 April 12, 1959 (see
correspondence - Exhibits) did he make any claim of
breach of warranty or that the system was not operating
properly. His notice of alleged breach of warranty is this
disputed letter of April 12, 1959, shown as Emibit D-8.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that this emibit is
not admissible for the reasons set forth in the argu~t
to Point m above, but in addition to that the notice given
was far from timely. It seems unbelievable that a person
would have lost upwards of 30,000 young poults without
discovering the cause of it. The evidence and testimony
was that Mr. Wilson pla·ced in the coop three different
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broods for the years 1958 and 1959, the last brood beiJ
in the Spring of 1959, before he discovered that there w
an unusual draft in the coop that caused the deaths,
his opinion, complained of. Plaintiff offered substanti
evidence that the turkey poults died of causes other th~
draft and Dr. Royal Bagley testified concerning the numb
of poults that died from various bacterial causes. R
gardless of causation, :however, it is the belief of the plai
tiff that no proper notice of breach of warranty was give
either orally, by the letter of April 12, 1959, or in a time:
manner. Taking the letter of April 12, 1959, at fa<
value, it is the position of the plaintiff that this does n<
constitute a notice of breach of warranty within the meru
ing of Utah Code Annotated 60-3-9, set forth as follows:
"Acceptance does not bar action for damages-In th
absence of express or implied agreement of the pa1
ties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall n(
discharge the seller from liability in damages, or ott
er legal remedy for breach olf any promise oc wru
ranty in the contract to sell or the sale. Burt if, afte
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notic
to the seller of the breach of 'allY promise or wru
ranty within a reasonable time after the buyer know!
or ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall TI{]
be liable therefor."
"Statutory Requirement of Notice-In practically e\i
ery jurisdiction the provisions of the state statut
requiring notice of breach of warranty are the sam
as Sec. 49 of the Uniform Act. The courts uniforml:
hoJd under such statutory provisions requiring n<J
tice of breach of warranty "within a reasonable tim
after the buyer knows or ought to know of sud
breach," that as a prerequisite to a recovery for :
breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notio
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to the seller of such breach within a reasonable time
after he knew or under the circwnstances should
have known of the breach. The notice required by
Sec. 49 of the Uniform Sales A!ct is a notice given
within such time as a notice would be given by an
ordinarily careful man, acting under the same circumstances and with respect to goods of the same
character. The purpose of the provision requiring
such a notice is clearly to give the seller timely information thart the buyer proposes to look to him for
damages for the breach, so that the former may
govern his conduct accordingly.''
46 Am. Jur. 438, Sec. 257.
"In the absenoe of a contractual provision for notice,
it has been held or recognized that notice must be
given by the buyer of goods to enable him rto recover
damages for the seller's breach of an expressed warranty, it must be given promptly or within a reasonable time." 41 A.L.R. 2d 817."
There are numerous cases supporting the gen&al
statement in A.L.R. set forth above.
In the case of Mawhinney vs. Jensen (Utah) 232
P.2d 769, an action was brought based upon breach of
warranty as to the quantity of personal property sold under the contract. The court held:
"A survey of the cases on this matter shows that
timely notice is a vital condition precedent to an action for breach of warranty ,Esbeco Distilling Cwp.
v. Owings Mills Distillery, D.C., 43 F.Supp. 380; Pearl
v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 5·29, 58 N.E.
2d 825; Bawn v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d
801. Thirty-two months is, in law, an unreasonable
delay lUlder the circwnstances of this case. Barburger v. Stem Bros., Sup., 189 N.Y.S. 74; Stewart
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v. B.R. Menzel & Co., 181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522.
The statute insists on notice within a reasonable time,
but laches in equity only arise when the delay has
caused prejudicial injury. Therefore the passage of
time in and orf itseU bars the breach of warranty action, but nort the remedy of reformation. In the instant ease it is impossible to believe that the plaintiffs did not discover, long before 32 months had
elapsed, that a couch, a stoker, dishes, sheets and 8
steam radiatocs, etc., were missing. The complaint
states that the defectiveness of the heating system
was discovered two weeks after :the final contract was
signed. The dumurrer was properly sustained on the
two claims for breach of warranty. The case is reversed and remanded with directions to proceed in
accordance with the views expressed herein. Costs
awarded to appellant."
.ks the language of the court indicates, it is impos-

sible 1JO believe, under the circumstances of the present
case, that the defendant did not discover long ;before fourteen months from the date of installation of the ventilator
fans that they were defective or causing problems to his
turkeys. And, therefore, have been under an obligation
to notify plaintiff of 'Such defect.
Not only was the notice not timely, but the plaintiff
contends that notice, if given, was not adequate. Notice
to be sufficient must at least inform ·the plaintiff or fairly
advise him of the alleged defects, must be in such form
as to dispel any inference that the defendant waived any
defects, and it must fairly apprise the seller of the buyer's intention to look to him for damages because of the
alleged breach. None of those requirements are present
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Authorities as to what is an adequate notice are as foJlows:
Truslow and Fulle, Inc. vs. Diamond Bottling Corpo. .
ration 151 Atlantic 492, 71 A.L.R. 1142.
The court here interpreting Section 49 of the Uniform
Sales Aot which is the same as 60-3-9 says as follows:
"The purpose of the pro~sion requiring such a notice
is clearly to give the seHer timely information that
the buyer proposes to look to him fior damages for
the breach, that the former may govern his conduct
accordingly. Such notice need take no special form,
but it must be such as fairly to apprise the seller of
that intention (many citations). Where the question
whether proper notice was given depends upon the
construction of a written instrument, or the circumstances are such as to lead to only one reasonabl canelusion, it will be one of law; but wheTe the conclusion involves the effect of various circumstances capable of diverse interpretation, it is necessarily one
of fact for the trier."
In this case the defendant notified the plaintiff on numerous occasions concerning defects of design of the
bottle caps and at all times the plarintiff was aware of the
defendant's losses because the defendant kept the plaintiff informed.

The court held, however, that these com-

plaints were not sufficient notice that the defendant
claimed a breach of warranty and its conduct was such
that the plaintiff was not reasonaJbly i.nformed of the defendant's intention to make such a claim.
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The Court said:
"We cannot say that they do. It is no doubt true, as
Rugg, Chief Justice, said in Nashua River Paper Co.
v. Linday, 242 Mass. 206, 210, 136 N.E. 358, that
complaints as to the quality of goods furnished may
be found to constitute a sufficient notice of a breach
orf warranty. But that can be true only where the
complaints under all the circumstances of the case
are such as reasonably to apprise the seller that the
buyer intends to daim damages for the breach."
Aaron Bodek & Son vs. Aurach, et al. 146 Atlantic
546.
In this ease the plaintiff purchased a quantity of
Army blankets from the defendant. After delivery to the
plaintiff in April the blankets were sold by him. Within
one month all the blankets were returned by his customers as not of the grade and quality represented. Plain·
tiff waited until July and then called defendant and requested that he come over and look at the blankets. Defendant refused to do so. Thereafter, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter expressing his intention to sue for breach
of contract. Two years later plaintiff instituted this ac·
tion. In additio!Il! to finding that notice was not given
within a reasonable time, the court had the following to
say about the adequacy of notice given:
"For another reason nortice did not meet the require
ments orf the statute. The telephone conversation of
July was not a notice that the blankets delivered were
not in aocoroance with the contract. The only thing
plaintiffs did was ask defendants to go and look at
the blankets. There was no assertion that there was
anything wrong with them, or if it was, it failed to
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state any particulars. Neither does fue letter of August 1st state in what respect there was a fiailure to
deliver in accordance with the contract. 'Dhat letter merely informs defendants that plaintiffs propose
to bring suit for breach of oontract, without stating
the nature of the breach. Plaintiffs buy goods; they
deal with them as their own and ultimately sen them.
They ought not to be heard to say that the goods
were not those contracted for when they never, from
the time of delivery down to the date of :tJhe filing of
the statement of daim, over two years, informed defendants in what respect there had been a breach of
contract.''
"To this we may add that, where a vendee desires to
avail himself of an alleged breach of warranty of
quality in a sale of goods, he must, in giving notice
of the breach, specify with some reasonaJble particularity in what it oonsists."
That is the situation in this case. Even if Mr. Wilson
did complain that the auger feeders were defective, he
moved them into the yard, utilized them fior a number of
years, got the use and benefit out of them and never
made and daim for damages until after a lawsuit was
commenced on another purchase. The same is true in respect to the ventilator fans. A mere complaint is not sufficient notice of breach of warranty to give rise to a cause
of action under 60-3-9. The plaintiff further contends that
the burden of pleading and plloving notice is upon the defendant. (See 71 A.L.R. 1150; 53 A.L.R. 2d 274; W. S.
Maxwell Company vs. Southern Oregon Gas Company,
158 Oregon 168, 74 P. 2d 594; 114 A.L.R. 697.
Returning to the basic issue concerning this matter
of sale, it is the further position of the plaintiff that no
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sale was ever made by the plaintiff to the defendant upon
which an action can be brought for breach of warranty.
The eochlbits clearly show that the defendant purchased
f:rom Utah Poultry from time to time, Jamesway products.
Utah Poultry was a dealer in Jamesway products. Exhibit
P.16 shows that on February 4th, a date midway between
the purchase of the ventilator system and the auger feeders, E. I. Wilson purchased from Utah Poultry and Farmers
Co-op eighty Jamesway brooders and their attachments.
The sale price of this item of $2,609.60. There never has
been any contention that this J amesway equipment was
sold to the defendant by Jamesway itself. The fact is that
it was sold to the defendant by Utah Poultry. The defendant admits that in December of 1957 he owed Utah
Pou1try apprmdmately $200,000.00 for merchandise and
poultry pliDchased through Utah Poultry. A summary of
the law concerning the necessity of privity in this type
of sale is as follows:
"The fact a seller warrants the condition or quality
of a thing sold does not itself, according to one view,
impose any liability on him to third persons who are
in no way parties to the contract. In such a case,
there is no privirty of contract between the seller and
such third persons, and ·this precludes any right on
their part to any advantage or benefit to be derived
from the warranty. There is authority to the effect
that there can be no implied warranty without privity
of contract, and it has been held that a manufacturer
is not liable for breach of warranty to third persons
who are strangers to the contract of manufacture or
sale f01r the resulrts of any defects which may later
develop in his product. 46 Am. Jur. 487, Sec. 306."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
The plaintiff will admit that there are cases to the
contrary, however the prevailing view and the weight of
authority is to the effect that there may be no recovery
on the theory of breach of warranty against a manufacturer or seller of a product alleged to have caused injury
where there is no privity of contract between the injured
person and the defendant manufacturer or seller. Those
cases hold that privity is indispensible to a successful
warranty action. There are hundreds of cases cited in
support of this rule in 75 A.L.R. 2d at Page 46 through
Page 54. Utah has not, to tile extent of our research,
adopted a rule on the subject.
POINT V
TIW;

COURT MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS IN-

STRUCTING THE JURY.

The court, in preparing its instructions, took the actual pages submitted by the plaintiff and defendant, whieh
were submitted on different forms of stationery and different type, and attempted to amalgamate them. In doing so the court had occasion to strike certain provisions
from the instructions submitted and to correct them by
interlineation and ink markings and by the use of further deletions to confirm with what the court felt was
proper law. This manner of preparation of instructions
could not help but cause confusion, duplication, and improper emphasis to particular segments of the instructions. The appellant addresses itself to the following instructions:
Instruction No. 11 is erroneous and in error ~or the
following reasons:
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The Court, in attempting to define proximate cause,
is imposing upon a contract a tort principle. Proodmate
cause is not involved in this case. The respondent's remedies are defined under the Uniform Sales Aot, especially
60-5-7 which provides remedies for breach of warranty.
The Court, in its definition of proximate cause under In·
struction No. 11, adopts the language of J.I.F.U. 15.6
found on Page 49, except that the COurt has substituted
"result" for the worn "injury" in J.I.F.U. instructions.
Then to further complicate this instruction, the Court
adds the alternative language at the top of Page 50, but
substitutes, however, in lieu of "irt may operate directly
or through intermediate agencies or through conditions
created by such agencies", the words "it may opeTate di·
rectly or by putting the intervening agencies in motion."
This is strictly a tort instruction. The Court then turns
to the language used in J.I.F.U. 15.7 concerning concur·
ring negligence as proximate 1causes. 15.7 is set forth as
follows:
-:
"The law does not necessarily recognize Olllly one prox·
imate cause of an injury, 'COnsisting of only one fac·
tor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause
of an injury, an in such a case, each of the partici·
pating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proxi·
mate cause and both may be held responsible."
The Court then uses this language in its Instruction
No. 11:
"This does not mean that the law seeks recognizeS
only ooe proximate cause of a result consisting of
only ooe factor, one act, rme element of circumstance,
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or the conduct of only one person. To the contrary,
the acts and omissions of two or more persons may
work concurrently as the efficient cause of a result,
and in such a case each of he participating acts or
omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause.
This is true regardless of the relative degree of the
contribution; and where such concurrent conditions
exist, it is no defense to say that one cause or condition was more reSiponsible than another."
The net result of this language was to cause the jury
to believe that even though the turkeys died as a result
of bacterial causes and over medication, which were soleJy
attributable to the defendant, if one turkey died as a result of a draft or getting its head caught in the auger
mechanism, or for some other reason that might be aJttributable to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff would be responsible for all of the damage and loss sustained by the
defendant. This type of conclusion would be entirely
warranted under the Court's instructioo concerning proximate cause and concurring causes. The Oourt, however,
did not, in its application of tort principles to contract
issues, instruct the jury as to contributocy cause, which
would have been a necessary sequal. It would seem entirely inappropriaJte to instruct coooerning proximate
cause in a contract case without instructing concerning
contributory causes, which, if the analogy is appropriate,
would have eliminated any damage being assessed against
the plaintiff for reason that birds obviously died as a result of the acts of the defendant.
The appellant most emphatically urges the Court that
this instruction is in error.
The Court's Instructions No. 29 and 30 should have
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been sufficient to inform the jury as to whart they should
find, if they should find anything, for the defendant. Authorities for the proposition that intervenin·g causes and
contributing causes are only negligence doctrines are found
in 38 Am. Jur. 721, Sec. 67 and 15 Am. Jur. 408, Sec. 18.
Direct or proximate and remorte consequences are only
negligence doctrine.

Instruction No. 16 is erroneous for the Corurt merely
instructed the jury as to what a warranty is by implication. The Court neglects to inforn1 the jury concerning
the other provisions of 60-1-15 that would be properly
applicabJe to this case, to-wit: Subsections 2 and 3. These
provisions state as follows:
Where the goods are bought by description
from a selleT who deals in goods of that description
(whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
orf merchantable quality."

" ( 2)

If the buyer has examined the goods, there is
no implied warranty as regards defects which such
examinaition ought to have revealed."

" ( 3)

Plaintiff requested the Court to give its Instruction
No. 5 which would have completely and adequately supplied the deficiency that is had in the Court's Instruction
No. 16. The law clearly states that there is no implied
warranty in a situation where there is an express war·
ranty co~ering operational features and that an implied
warranty exists only where an express warranty is not
one concerning the quality or functionability of rthe mer·
chandise. Where the buyer has ihad the opportunity to
to inspect the commodity and the seller is guilty of no
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fraud, there can be no implied warranty of merchantability and the buyer takes the goods as he finds them;
provided that the goods he receives are those of the same
type and quality as that which he inspected prior to the

sale.

(Sre 46 Am. Jur. 525, Sec. 342).
Instruction No. 18 is erroneous because it is unneces-

sary. The Court here is informing the jucy what may or

may not be concerning the financial arrangement.

This

instruction is to the effect that the ci11cumstance could
be as the defendant states it, looding credooce to a situ-

ation that is unsupported by evidence.

Because it is not

an instruction as to the law on the matter, it is an intrusion by the Court into the prerogatives of the jury.
Instruction No. 33, Verdict F1orm A and B.
the instruction of the Court and

~rom

From

,the Verdict Forms

A and B, it is impossible for the jury to find foc the defendant on one cause of action and not for him on anorther
cause of action.

The instruotiO!ll and the verdict forms

are such that the jury must merge its findings on the first
and second cause of action, to-wit: the vootilator system
and the auger feeder systems. It is impossible to tell from
the verdict form Whether they found for or against the
plaintiff in respect to either of the said ~causes of action,
which are separate transactions.

The forms are couched

in such a way that the jury ;could reasonably believe that
they had to find either for or against the plaintiff on both

causes. Instruction No. 33 is also erroneous.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL.
The plaintiff made a timely motion for a new trial
in writing (R. 84.), tile principal basis of the motion being
newly discovered evidence material for the plaintiff, which
the plaintiff could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. Attached to the plaintiff's
martian were affidavits (R. 86, R. 87, R. 88, R. 89, R. 90, R.
91, R. 92, R. 93, R. 94, R. 95, R. 96, R. 97, R. 98). That on
the very last day of the trial, shortly before the matteT was
sUJbmi:tted to the jucy, the plaintiff was informed by one of
the plaintiff's witnesses that there had been a water problem that killed many of the turkeys. This matter came
as a complete surprise to the plaintiff and at a time when
the plaintiff had no opportunity to adequately prepare concerning rthe source of water supply. An effort was made,
during the trial of the matte·r, to secure witnesses concern·
ing the water problem, ·and the plaintiff attempted to secure these witnesses by subpoena. A request was made
for a continuance, after the defendant had rested and before rebuttal testimony was had, and the Court allowed
the plaintiff a few minutes in which to obtain the necessary witnesses. Unfortunately, the plaintiff was not a:ble
to olbtadn witnesses necessary to establish the facts con·
tained in the affidavits attached to its motion for a new
trial. The affidavits of Dr. Lawrence Morris, Professor
of Animal Husbandcy, the affidavit of Dr. Royal A. Bag·
ley-, a Veterinary Surgeon and Bacteriologist, were to the
effect that the water used by the defendant for his young
turkey- porults would be of extreme harm to them, if not
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fatal. Based upon the analysis examined and the mineral
content of the said water, the water could be a substantial
causal factor in the death of the poults, which were the
subject of the lawsuit. To deny the plaintiff an opportunity to establish by legal proof the derteriorrating effect of
this water, was a gross injustice and an abuse of discretion.
Counsel made every effort to supply the Court with complete information concerning this newly discovered evidence and the affidavits supplied to the court were persuasive and factual. The affidavits were of the highest
caliber and of prroven reputartion. Their opinion concerning the adverse effect o[ this water upon poults should
have entitled the plaintiff to a new trial. This was a classic basis for granting of a new trial under Rule 59(a-4).
The Court, in hearing the argument, cooceded that counsel for the plaintiff had no opportunity to establish the
evidence supplied in the affidavits attached. The reoorrd
in the ease shows that the plaintiff was well prepared, e'xcept for a jury trial, and had utilized full and complete discovery methods and had failed to discover this unusual and
unexpected circumstance that expLains the loss complained
of by the defendant on a ground that oompletely absolved
plaintiff from liability. The Court's refusal to grant tJhe
plaintiff a new trial is .clearly an abuse of discretion o[
great harm and prejudice to tlhe plaintiff. The plaintiff's
efforts and sizeable expense in obtaining this information
should not go unobserved and be unavailing in a situation
wherein the law provides a 'remedy, to.. wit: Rule 59.
The plaintiff sets forth other ground in its motion far
a new trial, substantial parts of which have been argued
above under the other counts of error.
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CONCLUSION

The appellant respectfully urges this Court to firui
that the judgment in favor of the defendant was errone()'W
and without basis for the following reasons:
1. There never was a sale from the plaintiff to the
defendant.
2. There was never a warranty expressed or implied.
3. If there was a warranty, there was never notice
given to the plaintiff in a timely and adequate manner.
4. That defendant suffered no damage as a result of
alleged breach of warranty concerning the auger feeder
units.
5. The errors committed by the Court in the admission of inadmissible evidence and the erroneous instruc·
tion of the jury and the failure of the Court to allow the
plaintiff a new trial in order to submit the evidence referred
to in the affidavits which offer a reasonable and satisfac·
tory explanation of the losses of the defendant, other than
caused by the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD·, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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